and if anyone asks for any proof that it really was he who granted such an inscription?
The name of this feature you seek is non-repudiation (non-repudiation). It is one of the features that cryptographic systems often seek to achieve (the others being confidentiality, authenticity and integrity).
Before commenting on the ways "hard" to ensure non-repudiation, I want to say that I agree with the other answers and comments: if you trusting in your university’s staff and IT staff (i.e. not concerned for example with some system administrator manually entering a certificate in the bank on behalf of a teacher without your permission), so it’s all a matter of authentication and authorization:
- Establish your credential policies to reduce the risk of someone improperly accessing your teacher’s account (for example, by requiring strong passwords - but memorable - more some form of second factor). In my college, for example, we received a paper with a list of Pins, and for each "sensitive" action in the system we had to insert one of them, even though it was already logged in. This used PIN was no longer reused for anything.
- Make sure your application establishes the authorization rules correctly (i.e. ensure that only users of the "teachers" group have access to the "defer" functionality").
If, on the other hand, you need a stronger guarantee, then we go into technical solutions. Some people have suggested biometrics, seriously or jokingly, but the fact is that biometrics is for authentication, not to repudiate you. Worse, alone biometrics aren’t even that good for authentication: if you leave an unsupervised door with a retinal reader next door, where one only has to look at the door if it opens, about 7000 people could look at it and the system could identify them as being you... Biometrics only work if accompanied by other factors (e.g., you show a document to an employee - if identifying - and then looks at the retina reader - if authenticating). That response in security.SE shows more details.
The most widely used means of non-repudiation is digital signature. Let’s say that each teacher creates for himself a digital certificate (where himself established the private key - if it was the faculty that provided it to him, non-repudiation does not apply), and recorded it in his system. The university itself can be the Certifying Authority, or in even more formal cases can be used for example the services of ICP-Brazil - whose digital signatures have by law the same validity as "normal" signatures in this country. This certificate can be on the user’s own computer (less secure) or on a smartcard (safer).
It is the user’s responsibility to ensure the security of their certificate, not allow their private key to be accessed by third parties. And/or notify the university immediately if it is suspected that it has been compromised. Under these conditions, assuming that only the teacher has access to his private key, it is enough to make his critical actions in the system have to be digitally signed by him. Thus, while guaranteeing its integrity and authenticity (i.e. no one can tamper with the content without invalidating the signature, and no one can sign for it) if he also has non-repudiation (if his signature is there, there is no way he denies that it was he who signed).
Again, I am giving this information in order to make the answer complete: this whole paraphernalia has no negligible cost (if not in cash, but in inconvenience to users), and should not be used unless really necessary. In 99% of cases it is Overkill, and simple trust in system administrators is sufficient to turn authenticity into non-repudiation ("it is registered in the database that Action X was executed by User Y, period").
I deleted some of my comments so it wouldn’t get messy here, I would suggest you do the same. We’ll be suggesting for a DNA scanner on the terminals. The guy puts his arm on the sensor, takes a needle, and if the DNA matches, it’s him :)
– Bacco
Joking aside, I could make a password system that would send a confirmation SMS with token to the person’s mobile phone. Only by releasing this token into the system within a reasonable time would the deferral be recognized.
– Bacco
@Bacco I watched Gattacca, you can bypass the DNA system :)
– Maniero
Each user does not have his own login and password to access the system? In this case, simply store the record of the user who granted the process. The guarantee that the person is really she is in the privacy of the login. Using more complex solutions can end up hurting your own initial principle of "reducing bureaucracy in some enrollment processes". :)
– Luiz Vieira
Actually, some options would bureaucratize more =/
– João Neto
3 options: 1) password. But if the person puts the password in a post-it... 2) link between the site and the person 'physical'. Type Biometric Reader. Problem: To access you need to be in front of the computer that has the reader. 3) link between the site and a physical system but without obligation to be in front of a specific computer. Type send an SMS or a "vocal" message: the site creates the code, memorizes it in the database for example 5 min, sends it and waits for the person to type the code. Also give a look here https://www.yubico.com/
– Peter
Only the Biometric, because the Token (nda prevents to lend to someone)
– Dorathoto
I believe that Bacco and Peter are right. I would text. Google uses SMS. If it involved large amounts of money, it would justify using biometric readers. Here at my university all documents are digitally signed, and we only use login and password.
– Avelino